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بررسی تاثیر حقوق مالکیت بر افزونه خواهی در کشورهای منتخب OPEC و OECD

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 کارشناس ارشد اقتصاد، دانشکده ی اقتصاد، مدیریت و علوم اجتماعی، دانشگاه شیراز، شیراز، ایران.

2 استاد تمام اقتصاد، دانشکده ی اقتصاد، مدیریت و علوم اجتماعی ، دانشگاه شیراز، شیراز، ایران.

3 دانشیار اقتصاد، دانشکده ی اقتصاد، مدیریت و علوم اجتماعی ، دانشگاه شیراز، شیراز، ایران.

چکیده

چکیده گسترده
معرفی:
دولت‎ها به بهانه اصلاح موارد شکست بازار و به دلیل تأمین کالاهای عمومی، بروندادها، اطلاعات نامتقارن و بازدهی فزاینده در اقتصاد دخالت می‎کنند. اما گاهی این ملاحظات منجربه پیدایش رفتار افزونه خواهی می­شود. افزونه خواهی آثار سوء بسیاری دارد که
می­توان به کاهش خلاقیت و نوآوری، فراگیرشدن قوانین و مقررات موردی، رایج شدن
رشوه­دهی و رشوه­ستانی و تحریف ساختار انگیزه اقتصادی، اجتماعی و زیان رفاهی اشاره کرد. از این رو شناسایی عوامل اثرگذار بر افزونه خواهی حائز اهمیت است. چرا که با بررسی و کنترل این عوامل می­توان زمینه شکل گیری افزونه­خواهی را کاهش و اقتصاد را به رشد و توسعه پایدار سوق داد.
متدولوژی:
این مقاله به بررسی عوامل تأثیرگذار بر افزونه خواهی در دو گروه کشورهای منتخب صادرکننده نفت (اوپک) و کشورهای منتخب عضو سازمان همکاری و توسعه اقتصادی از سال 1996تا 2017 می‌پردازد. بدین منظور، از رگرسیون داده­های پانل استفاده می­گردد. در ابتدا، با استفاده از آزمون مانایی هادری-رائو (آزمونی معتبر با وجود شکست ساختاری)، وضعیت مانایی داده­ها بررسی می­شود و نیز سایر آزمون­های پیش از تخمین انجام می­گردد. سپس، به دلیل وجود وابستگی مقطعی، ناهمسـانی واریانس و خود همبستگی بـین جمـلات اخلال در هر دو گروه کشورهای منتخب صادرکننده نفت و کشورهای منتخب سازمان همکاری و توسعه اقتصادی، الگوهای مدنظر با استفاده از روش دریسکول - کرای تخمین زده می­شود.
یافته:
یافته های تجربی این مقاله حاکی از آن است که در هر دو گروه مذکور، حقوق مالکیت، دموکراسی و تولید ناخالص داخلی سرانه اثر منفی و معنادار و نظامی­گری و تورم، اثر مثبت و معناداری بر فعالیت­های افزونه خواهی دارند. نتایج همچنین نشان می­دهد که در کشورهای منتخب سازمان همکاری و توسعه اقتصادی، با افزایش تحصیلات، افزونه خواهی کاهش می­یابد. این در حالی است که افزایش تحصیلات، تأثیر معنادار و مثبتی بر افزونه خواهی در کشورهای صادرکننده نفت می­گذارد. همچنین در کشورهای صادرکننده نفت، رانت نفتی اثر مثبت و معناداری بر افزونه خواهی دارد. این نتیجه بدین معنی است که، با افزایش رانت نفتی در این کشورها، انگیزه افراد در انجام کارهای مولد کمتر شده و بیشتر به سمت فعالیت­های توزیعی روی می­آورند.
نتیجه:
نتایج این مطالعه نشان می­دهد حقوق مالکیت تأثیر منفی و معناداری بر زمینه شکل گیری افزونه خواهی در هر دو گروه دارد. با افزایش 1 واحدی حقوق مالکیت زمینه شکل گیری فعالیت افزونه خواهی در کشورهای صادر کننده نفت 0.06 واحد و در کشورهای عضو سازمان همکاری و توسعه اقتصادی 152/0 واحد کاهش می­یابد. نظامی گری در هر دو دسته از کشورها تأثیر مثبت ومعناداری بر افزونه خواهی دارد. با افزایش 1 واحد نظامی گری زمینه شکل گیری افزونه خواهی در OPEC  معادل 938/0 واحد و در OECD برابر با 374/0 واحد افزایش می­یابد.
همچنین افزایش 1 واحدی دموکراسی به ترتیب باعث کاهش 911/0 و 197/0 واحدی
افزونه­خواهی در گروه OPEC وOECD  می­شود و اثر معناداری دارد. متغیر بعدی که مورد بررسی قرار می­گیرد تحصیلات است. در کشورهای صادرکننده نفت تحصیلات تأثیر مثبت و معناداری بر افزونه خواهی دارد و در صورت افزایش ا واحدی تحصیلات زمینه شکل گیری افزونه خواهی 119/0 واحد افزایش می­یابد. اما در کشورهای OECD تحصیلات تأثیر منفی و معناداری بر زمینه شکل گیری افزونه خواهی دارد و با افزایش 1 واحدی تحصیلات، افزونه خواهی 1/0 واحد کم می­شود. عامل بعدی تولید ناخالص داخلی سرانه است که با افزایش 1 واحدی آن باعث می­شود افزونه خواهی در کشورهای OPEC و OECD هر دو معادل 0001/0 واحد کاهش یابد و این تأثیر معنادار است.علاوه بر این رانت نفتی در کشورهای OPEC تأثیر مثبت و معناداری بر زمینه شکل گیری افزونه خواهی دارد. در صورت افزایش 1 واحدی رانت نفتی زمینه شکل گیری افزونه خواهی 146/0 واحد زیاد می­گردد. در نهایت تورم در هر دو دسته از کشورها تأثیر مثبت و معناداری بر افزونه خواهی دارد. زمانی که تورم 1 واحد زیاد شود افزونه­ خواهی در OPEC وOECD به ترتیب 101/0 و 264/0 واحد افزایش می­یابد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

Investigating the Impact of Property Rights on Rent-seeking in Selected OPEC and OECD Countries

نویسندگان [English]

  • Afrooz sadat Foroughi pour 1
  • Ali Hussein Samadi 2
  • Rouhollah shahnazi 3

1 * M.S. in Economics, Faculty of Economics, Management, and Social Sciences, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran.

2 Professor of Economics, Faculty of Economics, Management, and Social Sciences, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran.

3 Associate Professor of Economics, Faculty of Economics, Management, and Social Sciences, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran.

چکیده [English]

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Governments intervene in the economy because of correcting market failures and providing public goods, externalities, asymmetric information and increasing efficiency. But sometimes these intervention lead to the emergence of rent-seeking behavior. Rent-seeking has many bad effects, For example reducing creativity and innovation, spreading the individual rules and regulations, Prevalence of bribery and bribery, and distorting the structure of economic and social motivation and welfare loss. Therefore, it is important to identify the factors that influence the rent-seeking. By investigating and controlling these factors, it is possible to reduce the formation of rent-seeking and lead the economic growth and development.
 
METHODOLOGY
This article investigates the influencing factors on rent-seeking in two groups of selected oil exporting countries (OPEC) and selected countries from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development from 1996 to 2017. For this purpose, panel data regression is used. At first, by using Hadri-Rao test (a valid test that is including structural failure), the stationary of the data is checked and other pre-estimation tests are performed. Then, due to cross-sectional dependence, heterogeneity of variance and autocorrelation between the disturbance term in both groups of selected oil exporting countries and selected countries of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the considered patterns are estimated using the Driscoll-Cray method.
 
 
FINDINGS
The empirical findings of this article indicates that in both mentioned groups, property rights, democracy and GDP per capita have a negative and significant effect, and military and inflation have a positive and significant effect on rent-seeking. The results also show that in the selected countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, with the increase in education, the rent-seeking decreases. In addition, the increase in education has a significant and positive effect on rent-seeking exporting countries. Also, in oil exporting countries, oil rent has a positive and significant effect on rent-seeking. This result means that, with the increase of oil rent in these countries, people's motivation to do productive work decreases and they do more distribution activities.
 
CONCLUSION
The results of this study shows that property rights have a negative and significant effect on the formation of rent-seeking in both groups. With an increase of 1 unit in property rights, the formation of rent-seeking activities in Petroleum Exporting Countries decreases by 0.06 units and in the Economic Cooperation and Development countries , it decreases by 0.152 units. Military has a positive and significant effect on rent-seeking in both categories. With the increase of 1 unit in military, the possibility of rent-seeking in OPEC increases by 0.938 units and in OECD by 0.374 units.
Also, an increase of 1 unit of democracy decreases of 0.911 and 0.197 units of rent-seeking in the OPEC and OECD groups, respectively, and has a significant effect. The next variable is education. In oil-exporting countries, education has a positive and significant effect on rent-seeking, and if one unit of education increase, rent-seeking increases by 0.119 units. But in OECD countries, education has a negative and significant effect on the formation of rent-seeking, and with an increase of 1 unit of education, rent-seeking decreases by 0.1 unit. The next factor is GDP per capita, which increases by 1 unit and it causes rent-seeking in both OPEC and OECD countries increase by 0.0001 units, and this effect is significant. In addition, oil rent in OPEC countries has a positive and significant effects on formation of rent-seeking. If the oil rent increases by 1 unit, the formation of rent-seeking increases by 0.146 units. Finally, inflation in both categories of countries has a positive and significant effect on rent-seeking. When the inflation increases by 1 unit, rent-seeking is increased in OPEC and OECD by 0.101 and 0.264, respectively.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Rent-Seeking
  • Property rights
  • Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
  • Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
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فصلنامه علمی پژوهشی اقتصاد مقداری
دوره 19، شماره 3 - شماره پیاپی 74
دوره نوزدهم، شماره سوم، پاییز 1401 (شماره مسلسل 74)
آذر 1401
صفحه 181-217
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  • تاریخ دریافت: 27 اسفند 1398
  • تاریخ بازنگری: 25 بهمن 1399
  • تاریخ پذیرش: 01 اسفند 1399
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