نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشیار گروه اقتصاد، دانشکده علوم اقتصادی و اداری، دانشگاه مازندران، بابلسر، ایران

2 فارغ التحصیل کارشناسی ارشد اقتصاد، دانشکده علوم اقتصادی و اداری، دانشگاه مازندران، بابلسر، ایران.

چکیده

چکیده گسترده
معرفی
فرار مالیاتی جزء اصلی فعالیت‌های زیر زمینی یا بخش نامنظم اقتصاد بوده و اقتصاددانان بیش از پیش به دنبال تجزیه و تحلیل این پدیده هستند. با توجه به این که ساختار مالیات وابستگی بالایی به ساختار حکمرانی داشته و بهبود در ساختار حکمرانی و کنترل فساد منجر به جلب اعتماد عمومی به دولت شده و می تواند اقتصاد زیرزمینی و فرار مالیاتی را کاهش  دهد، بررسی ارتباط بین کیفیت نهاد‌ها و حکمرانی خوب با فرار مالیاتی نیز اهمیت می‌یابد. تحقیق حاضر تلاش می کند تا با بررسی این رابطه طی دوره زمانی 96-۱۳۵۷، پاسخی به این سوال دهد که آیا بهبود کیفیت نهادها در ایران می‌تواند منجر به کاهش فرار مالیاتی شده و اقتصاد زیرزمینی در کشور را کاهش دهد یا خیر؟ به منظور تحقق این هدف، پس از مشخص کردن عوامل به وجود آورنده فرار مالیاتی، در مرحله اول با استفاده از روش علل چندگانه - شاخص چندگانه (MIMIC) به برآورد سری زمانی اندازه نسبی و مطلق فرار مالیاتی در ایران و بررسی علل و آثار آن با استفاده از بسته نرم افزاری  آموس[1]  و با روش حداکثر درست نمایی پرداخته  شده است. سپس در مرحله دوم پس از محاسبه ی سری زمانی متغیر پنهان فرار مالیاتی، به منظور بررسی و تجزیه و تحلیل تجربی تاثیر بلندمدت و کوتاه مدت کیفیت نهادی و سایر متغیرهای وابسته (تورم و تولید ناخالص داخلی) بر فرار مالیاتی در اقتصاد ایران در قالب الگوهای سری زمانی، از روش آزمون کرانه­ای خودرگرسیون برداری با وقفه­های گسترده استفاده گردید.
 
متدولوژی
همان گونه که بیان گردید، در مرحله اول با استفاده از روش علل چندگانه - شاخص چندگانه (MIMIC)، سری زمانی اندازه نسبی و مطلق فرار مالیاتی در ایران و بررسی علل و آثار آن با استفاده از بسته نرم افزاری آموس و با روش حداکثر درست نمایی محاسبه
می­شود.
پس از محاسبه­ی سری زمانی متغیر پنهان فرار مالیاتی، در ادامه مدل مربوط به بررسی رابطه بین کیفیت نهادی و فرار مالیاتی در ایران طی دوره زمانی مورد مطالعه به صورت زیر تصریح می­گردد:
LTE = f (LPR, LGDP, INF)  

 

LTE: لگاریتم فرار مالیاتی (سری زمانی به دست آمده در مرحله اول)
LPR: لگاریتم کیفیت نهادی
LGDP: لگاریتم تولید ناخالص داخلی.
 INF: نرخ تورم.
داده­ها و آمار مورد نیاز جهت مدل­ سازی در این تحقیق از منابع آماری بانک مرکزی، مرکز آمار ایران، ترازنامه انرژی و سازمان ریسک بین المللی گردآوری شده است.
 
یافته­ها
پس از مقایسه ملاک های برازش و نتایج تخمینی الگوهای برآورد شده، مدلی به عنوان مدل نهایی و مبنای محاسبات فرار مالیاتی انتخاب شد که در آن متغیرهای رشد مصرف انرژی، رشد تقاضای پول و رشد تولید ناخالص داخلی به عنوان آثار و متغیرهای تورم، نرخ بیکاری، نسبت صادرات به تولید ناخالص داخلی، نرخ ارز رسمی، درآمد سرانه، نسبت تملک دارایی سرمایه (هزینه عمرانی) به تولید ناخالص داخلی و نسبت مالیات بر واردات بر کل واردات به عنوان علل تشکیل دهنده فرار مالیاتی در نظر گرفته شده اند. این الگو از نظر معنادار بودن ضرایب عوامل و آثار فرار مالیاتی در مقایسه با سایر الگوهای برآورد شده وضعیت بهتری دارد. در این الگو متغیرهای تورم، بار مالیاتی، درآمد سرانه و نرخ ارز رسمی اثر مثبت و معنادار بر فرار مالیاتی داشته و متغیرهای شاخص باز بودن اقتصادی، اندازه دولت و نرخ بیکاری دارای اثر منفی بر فرار مالیاتی می باشد. لازم به ذکر است در الگوی انتخاب شده، بیشترین اثر فرار مالیاتی بر رشد تقاضای پول می باشد. همچنین در بین متغیر های علل بیشترین تاثیر مربوط به درآمد سرانه می باشد. نتایج برآورد مدل مرحله دوم نیز نشان می­دهد که تاثیر کیفیت نهادی هم در کوتاه مدت و هم در بلندمدت منفی و معنی دار می­باشد.
 
نتیجه
نتایج محاسبه ی اندازه ی نسبی فرار مالیاتی بیانگر این است که اگرچه روند فرار مالیاتی دارای نوساناتی در بازه زمانی مورد نظر می باشد، اما به طور کلی در دوره 38 ساله روندی افزایشی داشته است، به طوری که از 12/6 درصد GDP رسمی در سال 1357 به بیشترین مقدار خود در سال 1378 (46/24 درصد از GDP) افزایش یافته و در نهایت در سال 1394 به 33/11 درصد رسیده است. همچنین نتایج محاسبه ی اندازه ی مطلق فرار مالیاتی نشان می دهد که مقدار آن از63664 میلیارد ریال در سال 1357 به بیشترین مقدار خود در سال 1378 (290250میلیارد ریال) رسیده و در سال 1396 برابر با 89095 میلیارد ریال شده است.
بر اساس نتایج به دست آمده، علامت ضریب متغیر کیفیت نهادی هم در کوتاه مدت و هم در بلندمدت منفی و معنی دار بوده و بیان می‌دارد که بهبود کیفیت نهادها در ایران طی دوره مورد مطالعه، عاملی در جهت ممانعت از رشد بیشتر اقتصاد زیرزمینی و فرار مالیاتی می‌باشد، به گونه ای که یک درصد بهبود در کیفیت نهادها در بلندمدت منجر به کاهش 62/0 درصدی در فرار مالیاتی شده است.
همچنین تایج بیانگر این است که افزایش تورم در بلند مدت منجر به افزایش فرار مالیاتی در کشور شده و در مقابل، افزایش تولید ناخالص داخلی عاملی در جهت ممانعت از رشد بیشتر اقتصاد زیرزمینی و فرار مالیاتی می باشد.
 
[1] Amos

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

Institutional Quality and Tax Evasion in Iran

نویسندگان [English]

  • Mahdieh Rezagholizadeh 1
  • amirhosein alami 2

1 Associate Professor of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, University of Mazandaran, Babolsar, Iran.

2 Master of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, University of Mazandaran, Babolsar, Iran.

چکیده [English]

EXTENDED ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Tax evasion is a major component of underground activities or the irregular sector of the economy, and economists are increasingly seeking to analyze this phenomenon. Given that the tax structure is highly dependent on the governance structure and improvements in governance and corruption control structures lead to public confidence in the government and can reduce the underground economy and tax evasion, examining the relationship between the quality of institutions and good governance with Tax evasion are also important. This study tries to answer this question by examining this relationship during the period 1978-2018, whether improving the quality of institutions in Iran can reduce tax evasion and the underground economy in the country or not? In order to achieve this goal, after identifying the factors causing tax evasion, in the first stage using the method of Multiple Indicators - Multiple Causes (MIMIC) to estimate the time series of relative and absolute size of tax evasion in Iran and investigate the causes and effects using Amos software and with maximum likelihood method. Then, in the second stage, after calculating the time series of the hidden variable of tax evasion, in order to study and empirically analyze the long-term and short-term impact of institutional quality and other related variables (inflation and GDP) on tax evasion in the Iranian economy in Time series, ARDL Bounding test method was used.
 
METHODOLOGY
As previously mentioned, in the first stage, the method of Multiple Indicators - Multiple Causes (MIMIC) method is employed to estimate the time series of relative and absolute tax evasion in Iran, and to investigate its causes and effects using the AMOS software package and the Maximum Likelihood method. After calculating the time series of tax evasion, the model concerning the relationship between institutional quality and tax evasion in Iran during the study period is formulated as follows:
LTE = f (LPR, LGDP, INF)                                                                           (1)
Where: LTE: Logarithm of Tax Evasion (obtained in the first stage)
 LPR: Logarithm of Institutional Quality
 LGDP: Logarithm of Gross Domestic Product
INF: Inflation Rate
 
FINDINGS
After comparing the fit criteria and estimated results of the estimated models, a model was selected as the final model and basis for tax evasion calculations in which energy consumption growth, money demand growth and GDP growth as effects and inflation, unemployment rate, export-to-GDP ratio, official exchange rate, per capita income, capital asset acquisition ratio (construction cost) to GDP, and import tax ratio to total imports are considered as causes of tax evasion. This model is in a better position than other estimated models in terms of significance of coefficients of factors and effects of tax evasion. In this model, inflation, tax burden, per capita income and official exchange rate have a positive and significant effect on tax evasion, and economic openness index, government size and unemployment rate have a negative effect on tax evasion. It should be noted that in the selected model, the greatest effect of tax evasion is on the growth of money demand. Also, among the variables of causes, the most impact is related to per capita income. The results of estimating the second-stage model also indicate that the impact of institutional quality is significantly negative both in the short run and in the long run.
 
CONCLUSION
The results of calculating the relative size of tax evasion show that although the trend of tax evasion fluctuates in the desired period, but in general it has had an increasing trend over a period of 38 years, so that from 6.12% of official GDP in In 1978, it increased to its highest amount in 2000 (24.46% of GDP) and finally in 2016, it reached 11.33%. Also, the results of calculating the absolute size of tax evasion show that its amount increased from 63664 billion rials in 1978 to its highest amount in 2000 (290250 billion rials) and in 2018 equal to 89095 billion rials.
Based on the results, the sign of the coefficient for the institutional quality variable is negative and significant in both the short run and the long run. This indicates that improvements in institutional quality in Iran during the study period decrease growth of underground economy and tax evasion. Specifically, a one percent improvement in institutional quality in the long run leads to a 0.62 percent reduction in tax evasion.
Furthermore, the findings indicate that an increase in inflation in the long run increase tax evasion in the country. Conversely, an increase in gross domestic product (GDP) serves as a factor in preventing further growth of the underground economy and tax evasion.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • institutional quality
  • Tax Evasion
  • Underground Economy
  • Multiple Indicators - Multiple Causes (MIMIC)
  • ARDL Bounding test
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