فساد سیاسی و اداری: تاثیرات متقابل و نقش عوامل اجتماعی

نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده

University of Siena

چکیده

فساد مشکلی فراگیر در دنیاست که به سختی می‌توان درباره اثرات مخرب آن اغراق کرد. دو نوع فساد یکی پرداخت رشوه برای دور زدن قانون (فساد اداری) و دیگری نفوذ به حاکمیت برای تغییر قانون (فساد سیاسی) را می‌توان از یکدیگر متمایز کرد. با بررسی هر دو نوع فساد در 57 کشور نتایج بدست آمده نشان می‌دهد که یک رابطه مکمل بین فساد سیاسی و اداری وجود دارد. البته این ارتباط متقارن نیست و تاثیر فساد اداری بیشتر است. عوامل اقتصادی از جمله سطح توسعه یافتگی کشور از فساد اداری کاسته و فساد سیاسی را جایگزینی می سازد. از میان عوامل حاکمیتی نیز نتایج نشان می دهند که کارایی سیستم قضایی بر کاهش فساد اداری موثر است اما متغیرهایی مانند سختی نفوذ به دولت، پیش بینی ناپذیری تصمیمات دولت و نسبت مخارج سلامت در بودجه به عنوان شاخص های نشانگر رفتار دولت در سیاستگذاری تاثیر منفی بر فساد سیاسی دارند. یک وجه تمایز این مقاله تاکید بر عوامل اجتماعی مانند قبح رشوه‌خواری بر رواج فساد اداری و فرهنگ تبانی بین شرکت‌ها بر رواج فساد سیاسی است. نتایج نشان از بزرگ بودن اثر عوامل اجتماعی دارد به گونه ای که افزایش ده درصدی در قبح رشوه خواری موجب کاهش 20 نمره ای (به عنوان مثال کاهش 75 پله‌ای رتبه ایران در شاخص فساد) فساد می شود. تاثیر همکاری و تبانی بین شرکتها نیز قابل ملاحظه است. افزایش پنج درصدی در عضویت در اتحادیه ها یک افزایش یک درصدی در نفوذ و تاثیرگذاری بر دولت را به همراه دارد.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Political and Bureaucratic Corruption: Interrelation and the role of social factors

نویسنده [English]

  • abbas khandan
چکیده [English]

Corruption is a worldwide problem that hardly one can overstate about its negative consequences. Two kinds of corruption can be considered, one is proposing bribe to bend the rules (bureaucratic corruption) and the other is to lobby with the government (political corruption) to set favorable new rules. Through analyzing the two types of corruption in 57 countries, the results show that political and bureaucratic corruptions are complement. However, this complementary relation is not symmetric; bureaucratic corruptions has a greater effect. It was shown that economic development reduces the bureaucratic corruptions and substitutes it by political corruption. Among governance and political factors, efficiency of judiciary system brings bureaucratic corruptions down and other variables like difficulty of access to government, uncertainty of regulation and the proportion of health expenditure in public budget as indicators of government behavior in policy making have negative effects on political corruption. One prominent contribution of this paper is its focus on social factors like bribery disapproval and culture of collusion. The results point to the great role of social factors such that a 10 percent increase in bribe disapproval decreases the corruption score by 20 (it could, for example, improve Iran’s position by 75 in Corruption Perception Index ranking). The effect of business cooperation is also significant. A five percent increase in membership of business cooperation leads to one percent higher influence on government.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Bureaucratic corruption
  • Government capture
  • social factors
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