تاثیر درآمدهای نفت بر نهادها: رویکرد PVAR

نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده

هیئت علمی دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی شیراز

چکیده

هدف از این مطالعه بررسی تاثیر درآمدهای نفتی بر عملکرد نهادها در کشورهای صادرکننده نفت بوده است. در این راستا از داده‌های 18 کشور نفتی طی دوره زمانی 2012-1996 و الگوی خودتوضیح برداری پانل (PVAR) استفاده شده است. سپس الگوی مورد مطالعه شامل چهار متغیر رشد اقتصادی، تورم، آزادی اقتصادی و درآمدهای نفت و گاز، با استفاده از روش-شناسی PVAR مورد برآورد قرار گرفت. نتایج آزمون علیت گرنجری نشان می‌دهد، درآمدهای نفتی علیت گرنجری آزادی اقتصادی است. همچنین آزمون شرط ثبات الگو حاکی از باثبات بودن الگوی برآوردی است. در پایان با استفاده از توابع واکنش تکانه‌ای، اثر درآمدهای نفت بر آزادی اقتصادی (و سایر متغیرهای الگو) مورد بررسی قرار داد. نتایج بدست آمده حاکی از آن است که درآمد نفت در کشورهای صادرکننده نفت، باعث کاهش کیفیت نهادها در این کشورها خواهد شد که می‌تواند اثر منفی بر رشد اقتصادی نیز داشته باشد.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

The Impact of Oil Revenues on Institutions: PVAR Approach

چکیده [English]

The aim of this study was investigating of the impact of oil revenues on institutions in oil exporting countries. Using the PVAR methodology and data of 18 countries from 1996 to 2012, the studying model contains four variables of economic growth, inflation, economic freedom, and oil revenues, were estimated. The Granger causality test results show that, oil revenues is Granger causality of economic freedom. Also the stability condition test showed that the model is stable. Finally, using the impulse response functions, the impact of oil revenues was examined on economic freedom (as well as other variables of the model). The results indicated that oil revenues in oil-exporting countries reduce the quality of institutions in these countries, which can have negative effects on economic growth.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • PVAR Model
  • inflation
  • Oil Revenues
  • Economic Growth
  • Institutions

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